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Abstract—There are no technologies or protocols completely secure in network infrastructures, for this reason, this document aims
to demonstrate the importance of configuring security options on network equipments. On this occasion we will focus on the data
link layer of the OSI model, which is where controls have begun to be implemented at level of protocols. The tools that are used
in the research facilitate the implementation of a virtual laboratory, which consists of a base operating system (windows) in which
virtualbox is installed to mount linux mint, which will generate attacks; while in VMware, we installed a virtual machine that
allows you to add the image of a switch to our network simulation software (GNS3), which integrates all the components. The tests
were able to identify the vulnerabilities in MAC, ARP, VLAN and STP, and then to proceed to patch these security flaws. Keeping
the setting by default or ignoring the characteristics of network equipment are usually the reasons why these vulnerabilities exist.
Finally, it was proved how easy it can be to run an attack and at the same time to implement security measures on the layer 2 of
the OSI.
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Resumen—Hay no hay tecnologı´as o protocolos completamente seguro en las infraestructuras de red, por esta razo´n, este documento
tiene como objetivo demostrar la importancia de configurar opciones de seguridad en equipos de la red. En esta ocasio´n nos
centraremos en la capa de enlace de datos del modelo OSI, que es donde los controles han comenzado a implementarse a nivel de
protocolos. Las herramientas que se utilizan en la investigacio´n facilitan la implementacio´n de un laboratorio virtual, que consiste
en un sistema operativo base (windows) en el que se instala virtualbox Monte linux mint, que generara´ ataques; mientras que en
VMware, instalamos una ma´quina virtual que te permite an˜adir la imagen de un interruptor a nuestro software de simulacio´n de
red (GNS3), que integra todos los componentes. Las pruebas fueron capaces de identificar las vulnerabilidades en MAC y ARP,
VLAN, STP y luego proceder a estos fallos de seguridad. Mantener la configuracio´n por defecto o haciendo caso omiso de las
caracterı´sticas del equipo de red suelen ser las razones de por que´ existen estas vulnerabilidades. Finalmente, se comprobo´ lo fa´cil
que puede ser ejecutar un ataque y al mismo tiempo para implementar medidas de seguridad en la capa 2 de OSI.
Palabras Clave—Capa de enlace de datos, Infraestructura de redes, OSI, Protocolos, Seguridad.
INTRODUCTION
A t the present time there are many fields of study in thearea of technology due to its growth and application in
most of industries. For this project we enter in the areas of
networking and security (Manshaei et al., 2013), particularly
we analyze the security at layer 2 of the OSI model, showing
as well as the fragmentation of the threats and protection
measures facilitate the implementation of both.
Despite being compared with other models, the OSI model
is the standard reference by excellence in the operation of
communications between computer networks (Handel and
Sandford, 1996). It was defined in 1984 by the International
Organization for Standardization ISO with the name of Open
Systems Interconnection Reference Model and consists of 7
*Magı´ster en Informa´tica Empresarial
†Ingeniero en Sistemas
layers which are: physical layer, data link layer, network
layer, transport layer, session layer, presentation layer and
application layer (VARGAS and SIEMENS, 2013).
Security applied on networks does not always implies
excessive spending, controls that are not always fulfilled or
a burden to users, it is rather vital that a balance between
functionality, control and incident response exists (Crespo,
2005).
Making a study of layered security allows us to delve into
each one of the fields of the environment such as protocols
(ARP, VLAN, and STP), equipment and features, types of
trafficking, among others. The importance of this document is
that it invites researchers to divide problems and network level
security solutions to optimize the identification of failures and
the implementation of protective measures.
The revision of the security settings in the network, in
addition to the mentioned performance allows us to look to
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the operation and to design an infrastructure which intends to
determine critical failure points and overcome most eventua-
lities beyond security.
In his research DA´VILA (2012) explains in a very superfi-
cial but practical manner how to operate the communication
between the layers of the OSI model and he also clarifies that
the model itself is not considered as an architecture, since it
does not define any protocol to be used by layer. For that
reason, we speak about a reference model.
The schema of this work consists of a brief summary of the
content, followed by the key words that are used to reference
our document, the introduction that guides us through several
of the most important points of work and a related work
section which is where we make reference to all investigations
that in one way or another relate to our research. Then, we
mentioned what were the methods used to carry out the project
as well as the materials used and procedures followed to obtain
the results which are then discussed and compared with other
jobs. Finally, the findings of the project and references that
support them will be mentioned. The hypothesis that arises for
the present work poses that if the security options on network
devices are configured specifically in data link layer, it can
mitigate threats identified in our intranet. In addition, there
are security settings that allow us to establish controls which
will help us to identify where attempts to attack the network
come from.
One of the objectives of this project is to foster the
habit of configuring network security measures to reduce
the intrinsic vulnerabilities in our infrastructure as well as
to raise awareness among administrators of networks of the
importance of the availability of the network together with
the integrity and confidentiality of information. Particularly
for network administrators, it is suitable to be as up-to-date as
possible in the areas of security, networking, programming and
linux system administration is where SDN (Software Defined
Networking) aims, an innovation in the way of working,
receiving maintenance and configuring the networks.
RELATED WORK
The OSI model has been established as a conceptual fra-
mework for the development of equipments, protocols and
other technologies of networks since 1984 (Castan˜eda, 2016).
In DA´VILA (2012) article’s notes that in ethernet, data link
layer works with the physical address, the ARP protocol is
responsible for translating the IP addresses to MAC addresses,
to make this layer 2 uses the ARP tables, which is in charge
of associating each IP address with an MAC address.
Something very important that Ochoa Villalba (2011) men-
tioned is that the protocols are open. There are no secret in how
data are transported, which means that anyone has access to
review how the network’s protocols work. This enables anyone
to implement a service or application on these and to generate
attacks from different environments.
Virtual network security: threats, countermeasures, and
challenges (Bays et al., 2015) mentions the characteristics of
the different protocols and their inherent vulnerabilities, they
also show superficially how we should set security options.
Currently, there are proposals of new models of data object
for the in-depth analysis of network traffic as it is the case
of a group of Russian researchers (Get’man et al., 2016), who
propose an analysis design convenient to join analyzers as well
as processing data modified, compressed, or encrypted.
METHODOLOGY
This study was aimed to determine the level of attenuation
that would have the internal threats if security settings are
applied in layer 2 devices. The process that took place is to
describe a set of attacks that are facilitated by the existence
of vulnerabilities in various protocols and equipments of the
data link layer of the OSI model.
The laboratories were performed with software elements
that allowed us to develop each one of the practices in the
most realistic and possible way (Beberlein et al., 2017). For
the virtualization of operating systems that we assembled
(linux mint 18.1 and debian 9) we used virtualbox 5.1.18.
The linux images to simulate the CISCO switches were
installed in vmware Workstation Pro 12.5.7 through a server
of GNS3 for vmware that manages these images. Finally, we
installed GNS3 2.0.3 for the integration of all components and
simulation laboratories.
Additionally, various tools were installed in linux mint to
generate attacks and others to capture and analyze packets
that transmits on the network. Below you can find a brief
description of each one of them:
Dsniff.- It is a set of tools used for the audit of networks,
some of its most striking features include the intersection
of traffic encrypted with HTTPS and SSHv1 protocols
(Yeung et al., 2008).
Macof.- It is a tool that can flood a LAN switching with
random MAC addresses. (Bhaiji, 2007) (Crespo, 2005).
Vlan.- For this occasion the VLAN refers to an appli-
cation that is installed on linux to segment the same
network like in a switch.
Wireshark.- It is a packet Analyzer that captures the
traffic generated on the network. It tries to show data
packages as detailed as possible. (Lamping et al., 2014)
(Sanders, 2017).
Once installed and integrated, all the elements were tested,
each one of the attacks was conducted and the security options
were then set up.
The data collection was conducted in two fields. First, we
gathered as much information as possible concerning the issue
(both theoretical and practical aspects), and then, the practical
tests (laboratories) for each proposed attack in the layer 2 of
the OSI were carried out.
RESULTS
After the experiments, the results for each one of the planned
attacks were obtained. Later, relevant security options to
mitigate the effect of intrusions were set up. They are showed
in detail below.
Before going deeper into the attacks, it is important to
understand the next two components to improve the unders-
tanding of the labs.
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Table 1. Table of addressing of simulated computers for the realiza-
tion of the laboratories.
Device Interface IP Address Subnet Mask Gateway.
S1 VLAN 1 192.168.1.254 255.255.255.0 N/A
S2 VLAN 2 192.168.1.253 255.255.255.0 N/A
PC1 Ethernet 192.168.10.10 255.255.255.0 192.168.10.254
PC2 Ethernet 192.168.20.20 255.255.255.0 192.168.20.254
Linux
mint Ethernet 192.168.10.18 255.255.255.0 192.168.10.254
Debian Ethernet 192.168.20.9 255.255.255.0 192.168.20.254
PC3 Ethernet 192.168.20.30 255.255.255.0 192.168.20.254
PC4 Ethernet 192.168.10.40 255.255.255.0 192.168.10.254
Source: Prepared by the authors.
In addition to all this madness of IP addressing, with their
respective mask, Gateway, devices with interfaces that frighten
anyone, and rare names, we must provide users with something
visual to enrich their understanding.
Figure 1. This topology is used for the verification of the different
laboratories. What was changed in each one is the configuration of
the equipments.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
MAC Flooding Attack (CAM Table Overflow)
This attack consists on flooding the CAM table of a switch by
sending fake MAC addresses. Its execution is extremely simple
and is also based on the limitation of the switch DA´VILA
(2012) hardware. If the security settings and the network
design are inefficient all our intranet can be inoperable. To
display the Li et al. (2015) effects caused by this attack we
will do it with the help of images, but to avoid making a
collage of this, we will summarize the process into two parts:
when the attack is generated and how to set the protection.
To protect the equipment of this type of attack we must
enable port-security in the necessary interfaces, here are the
commands needed:
S1(config)#interface ethernet 0/2
S1(config-if)#switchport mode access
S1(config-if)#switchport port-security
S1(config-if)#switchport port-security maximum 2
S1(config-if)#switchport port-security violation shutdown
Figure 2. While MAC Flooding is generated from linux mint, the
communication between PC1 and PC2 is shown in the right window.
At first sight, there are no problems but to generate an attack with a
10000 addresses or more, the communication between the computers
on the network is interrupted.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Figure 3. The attack is executed on the linux computer while in the
switch CISCO the interface which generates MAC-Flooding has been
disabled.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
ARP Spoofing Attack
ARP spoofing aims to intercept the traffic of the network using
an ARP poisoning. This attack identifies the Gateway of the
network and the victim, and acts like a men in the middle to
get the data. In the image below, we detail the process to run
the attack.
The next step is to remove all traces of suspicion, and
therefore, we have to enable the flow of information on the
user PC using the command shown in Figure.
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Figure 4. The terminals on the left tell the victim and the Gateway
that attacker PC is the bridge of communication between both. The
right picture displays an http server configured in one of the CISCO
switch to simulate internet.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Figure 5. After leaving the ARP poisoning working at another
terminal, we run the command: echo 1 ¿/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip forward
not to generate suspicion and to allow navigation, as shown in the
browser to the right.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
This technique seeks to establish the attacker as a Man in
the Middle on the network to capture all the traffic that you
want to know. A very practical example is when an employee
wants to obtain private information of the company which only
the Manager has access to. He wants to get it for a particular
purpose or to create instability in the institution.
Finally, the attacker should have a network sniffing tool pre-
pared to obtain and sort all data that moves on the channel of
communication that was intercepted in the previous processes.
Figure 6. We capture the traffic- in this case specified the IP address
of the victim- and http as a protocol to capture data from the login,
which is shown to the right.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Figure 7. Finally once the traffic was filtered, we seek wireshark http
label to find the access credentials.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
To solve this security failure in ARP, we have two options:
one when the network works with DHCP and another when
you have static addressing. Static configuration must specify
the MAC for each computer that is associated with each in-
terface on the switch, while we have the following commands
for DHCP:
S1(config)#ip dhcp snooping
S1(config)#ip dhcp snooping vlan 10,20
S1(config)#ip arp inspection
S1(config)#ip arp inspection vlan 10,20
S1(config)#no ip dhcp snooping information option
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STP Attack
This Protocol as well as the previous ones have their vulnera-
bilities. The idea of the operation of STP is that it eliminates
loops at the layer level 2- which are caused by the redundant
links. It does it to create a root bridge, which is like the
bridge of our whole network, through which it passes all traffic
generated internally. So, if an attacker becomes the root bridge,
not only will he have access to the information of the network,
but it can also generate the kind of attacks such as man in the
Middle, denial of services or theft of application, among other
sessions.
In the first instance our attacker will use the application
yersinia to claim to be the root bridge of the network. The
only thing we have to do is to install the application and run
the action Claiming Root Role.
Figure 8. The left picture shows program yersinia ready to send the
attack on STP and the image on the right the switch root bridge of
our topology.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Once we have implemented yersinia, we can see the results
in the following graph, where our PC has established itself as
the root bridge of the intranet.
Figure 9. Once the attack was sent, it could be observed that with
a new query of STP on the switch that already indicates us that the
root bridge is in the interface FastEthernet 1/0 which is where it is
connected to our attacker device.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Finally to mitigate this technique in our CISCO switch, we
must enter the following commands:
S1(config-if-range)#spanning-tree portfast
S1(config-if-range)#spanning-tree portfast bpduguard
enable
S1(config-if-range)#spanning-tree portfast bpduguard
default (o)
What we get with these commands is that a range of
interfaces which we establish cannot send BPDU messages,
which are the ones that sends the STP Protocol to work.
In other words, the interface that sends these messages will
be shutdown for a while. The last command is optional (o).
Figure 10. In the console on the right we find commands to apply
security measures for this type of attack. A further very interesting
detail is that in the simulator of the switch this security parameter
already comes configured by default.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
VLAN Hooping Attack
VLAN hopping attack consists of moving from a VLAN to
another one that will not be accessible. The objective of this
procedure is obtain information of the users of the target
VLAN (below is the process that took place in this attack).
First, we check that we are in a VLAN and that we don’t
have access to another one, for example we are on VLAN 20
and skip to the 10.
Figure 11. Shown at the beginning by ping tests that there is only
connection between the devices that are in the same VLAN.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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The next step will be to determine if the attackers received
DTP (Dynamic Trunking Protocol) message, then proceed to
send to the switch messages DTP with yersinia to move our
interface of Access mode to Trunk mode.
Figure 12. From yersinia installed on our linux computer we send
DTP packages to change the port that we are connected from Access
to Trunk mode. In the console on the right it is observed that in
addition to the port-channel there is also the interface e0/0 in trunk
mode, the same that is connected to the attacking PC.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
For the VLAN hopping attack we must install several
packages and run many commands on our linux system:
mint-virtualbox mint# apt-get install vlan
mint-virtualbox mint# modprobe 8021q
mint-virtualbox mint# vconfig add enp0s3.10
mint-virtualbox mint# ifconfig enp0s3.10 192.168.10.20/24
up
Figure 13. A VLAN was created on linux with the same ID that the
victim VLAN and was assigned a sub-interface with an IP address
that belongs to the same rank in order to establish communication
with this segment.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
To conclude at this point there should be connection with
VLAN 10, as you can see in the picture below.
Figure 14. Finally we have to check that there is connection in both
VLAN.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
The aspects to consider in order to protect the network from
this type of threats are the following:
Do not use the native VLAN 1.
Create a VLAN called ”Black hole.and putting the ports
to non-use in turn off mode (shutdown).
Configure the access ports of statically way.
Disable DTP.
DISCUSSION
DA´VILA (2012) work above the level of layer 2 network
security mentions three very interesting myths of the data link
layer, which are:
MAC addresses cannot be falsified
A switch does not allow sniffing
The VLANs are separated from each other
As DA´VILA (2012) is responsible for exemplifying th-
roughout his work why he called myths to those claims, this
document sustains in the same way that using a MAC flooding
attack we can falsify and send a port thousands of fake MAC
addresses. If we perform an ARP spoofing we can become
in the Gateway of our network and analyze all the traffic
that is generated. Finally, to obtain communication between
VLANs is not necessary to generate attacks, we can do it
with properties defined on devices as trunk links.
Torres et al. (2013) in several passages of his work made
comparisons between the OSI model and TCP/IP model, with
which we are disagree to some extent, as we do not consider
TCP/IP a model for the functioning of computer networks but
the leading architecture in the communications market.
The International Organization for Standardization define
measures that must be seen to strengthen the security of the
networks, in the work A Near Field Communication (NFC)
security model based on OSI reference model (Fan et al., 2015)
several options are specified, the focus of this work resembles
the idea in various paragraphs of the work cited.
The article Network attacks: Taxonomy, tools and systems
Hoque et al. (2014) attributed the attacks to the network
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to factors such as the explosive growth of the internet, the
dependence of this to make a number of everyday activities,
among others.
It is worth mentioning that we agree with this point of view:
internet was at first not thought to establish security measures
in the processes that were developed, but rather to facilitate the
communication around the world. However, due to the amount
of tasks and transactions performed over the internet today it
is necessary to protect each actively.
Bull and Matthews (2016) explores the attacks to the
network that occur on layer 2 in a completely virtualized
environment as it develops in this article. The researchers
did several tests and identified vulnerabilities in the physical
machines that are very similar to the vulnerabilities in their
virtualized practices.
Arias Sa´nchez (2011) indicates us that communication th-
rough a medium can be an abstract concept of the data link
layer, in addition to the definitions of the IEEE about ethernet
that establishes two sublayers: Access Control to the middle
(MAC) which is in chrage of pass frames through MAC and
control protocols of logical link which recognizes logically
labels or protocols to be subsequently encapsulated.
CONCLUSIONS
As it has already been shown, it is very easy to carry out an
attack at layer 2 of the OSI model, but equally simple it is to
implement measures of safety in the equipments.
The exploitation of the vulnerabilities in this case can
be taken for the comfort of an administrator maintenance
configurations by default or by ignoring the characteristics and
functionality of the devices.
The elements of hardware and software used in this work
contributed largely to the results of the same. It has allowed
us to mount an environment as if you were working with real
devices.
Between various documents of the material collected in this
work are a very marked trend regarding the origin of the
attacks on network infrastructures, with variations related to
the percentages but holding that in the majority of cases the
attacks are generated from within the network.
It should be noted that failures of the security settings in
network devices are mentioned a lot. However, we need to bear
in mind that vulnerabilities exist in communication protocols
and different network devices on the market will be very varied
in ways that mitigate these vulnerabilities.
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